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Burton: Kosovo: To Bomb or Not to Bomb?

KOSOVO:
TO BOMB OR NOT TO BOMB?
THE LEGALITY IS THE QUESTION

LESLIE A. BURTON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1998 and 1999, Yugoslavia was engaged in an "ethnic cleansing,"
involving the systematic murder of its ethnic minorities, especially
within its state of Kosovo. 1 Although the United Nations issued
Resolutions condemning Yugoslavia's actions,2 the U.N. stopped short of
ordering any enforcement action.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") members agreed that
action must be taken to stop the slaughter. 3 After attempts to negotiate
peace in the region proved unsuccessful, NATO determined that an
aggressive response was the only altemative. 4 On March 24, 1999,
NATO-sponsored forces commenced bombing Kosovo. 5 The bombing
ended on June 10, 1999,6 having achieved its aim.

* Lecturer, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, California. LL.M. candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law; BA, magna cum laude, University of Portland; JD,
cum laude, Santa Clara Law School.
1. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Operation Allied Force: Reviewing the Lawfulness of NATO's Use
of Military Force to Defend Kosovo, 23 MD. J.INT'L L. & TRADE 295, 296-307 (1999).
2. See infra notes 13, 14, and 15.
3. Sharp, supra note 1, at 303.
4. Id.
5. Thomas D. Grant, Extending Decolonization: How the United Nations Might Have Addressed Kosovo, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 9, 15 (2000); Tina Rosenburg, A Bad Year for the
World's Border Guards: Editorial, N.Y. TiMES, July 2, 1999, at A.
6. Laura Geissler, The Law of Humanitarian Intervention and the Kosovo Crisis, 23 HAMLINE
L. REV. 323, 336 (2000).
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The subject of this paper is whether NATO's actions were legal under
international law.
Some scholars have maintained that the bombing was illegal in the sense
that its scope was too broad; e.g. that the types of weapons (such as
cluster bombs) were too indiscriminate; or that the targets were illegal
(some claim that the bombing targeted civilians and in some cases killed
the very refugees whom NATO was seeking to protect).? These
arguments are beyond the scope of this paper, which will address only
whether the decision to commence bombing was itself lawful under
international law.
II.

SOURCES OF AUTHORITY

Only two sources could have authorized NATO to use force against a
sovereign nation. The first source would have been the United Nations
Charter. The second source would have been customary international
law. Each of these will be examined separately.
A.

THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AS AUTHORITY FOR THE USE OF
FORCE

The United Nations Charter specifically recognizes the existence of
regional organizations, such as NATO, and allows regional organizations
to deal with matters of international peace and security, so long as these
activities are "consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations."g
In the NATO Treaty, the member countries agreed that NATO would not

use force in "any manner inconsistent with the United Nations
purposes.,,9
Several provisions of the United Nations Charter specifically authorize
the use of force against a sovereign nation. The question then becomes
whether NATO's use of force was authorized by any of the provisions of
the United Nations Charter.

7. Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from
Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1781-87 (2000).
8. V.N. CHARTER art. 52(1).
9. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 1,63 Stat. 2241, 34 V.N.T.S. 243, 244.
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1.
Security Council Can Approve Use of Armed Force to Maintain
International Peace
The United Nations Security Council may approve the use of force under
the provisions of articles 39 and 42 of the United Nations Charter. First,
the Security Council must determine that a "breach of the peace or act of
aggression" has occurred. 1O If the Council makes that determination,
then it may impose economic and other sanctions (such as severing
diplomatic relations) which do not involve armed force. II If the Council
finds that these measures would be inadequate, it may authorize the use
of armed force as is necessary to "maintain or restore international peace
and security.,,12
The Security Council did determine, under article 39, that Yugoslavia
was breaching the peace by its treatment of its ethnic minorities. In
Security Council Resolution 1160, issued in March 1998, it called for a
cessation of hostilities in the area and imposed an arms embargo. 13
When Yugoslavia refused to obey the resolution, the Security Council in
September 1998 issued Resolution 1199, which referred to an
"impending humanitarian catastrophe" in Yugoslavia and called for a
cease fire and a political dialog. 14 Yugoslavia again failed to heed the
resolutions. Yet another resolution, 1203, was passed in October 1998.
This one endorsed a cease fire which had been negotiated (but proved to
be short-lived) and condemned all acts of violence and terrorism. 15
None of the resolutions authorized even the lesser sanctions of article 41,
let alone the use of force under article 42.16 In fact, such an authorization
would have been impossible to obtain because it needed the votes of all
five permanent members of the Security Council,17 but at least two of
them (China and Russia) would not have consented. 18

10. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
II. [d. at art. 41.
12.
[d. at art. 42.
13. U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3868th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1160 (1998).
14. U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3930th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1199 (1998).
15. U.N. SCOR, 53d superrd Sess., 3937th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1203 (1998).
16. Grant, supra note 5, at 19.
17. U.N. Charter, art. 27(3), requires that non-procedural matters be passed only with the concurrence of all five permanent members of the Security Council. These members are: China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. U.N. CHARTER art. 23.
18. In fact, China, Russia, and India were the only members of the Security Council to vote to
condemn the bombings. Aaron Schwabach, The Legality of the NATO Bombing Operation in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 11 PACE INT'L L.R. 405, 416 (1999), citing Law and Right, When
They Don't Fit Together, THE ECONOMIST, April 3, 1999, at 19-20.
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The United States, through Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, took
the position that the Security Council, by issuing these Resolutions, had
authorized the use of armed force in KoSOVO.1 9 This contention is
without merit. Nothing in the Charter makes an article 39 resolution into
a self-executing article 42 resolution. States cannot infer that they have
Security Council approval to use armed force to enforce all Security
Council resolutions. 20 Further, after the bombing had commenced,
Secretary-General Annan reprimanded NATO, stating that it should not
have acted without Security Council authorization,21 offering further
proof that there was no Security Council approval. No authority exists
for the U.S. position, which was roundly dismissed by international law
scholars. 22
. Finally, regional organizations do not have any greater right to use force
than the United Nations does. Under article 53, regional organizations
cannot use force without the approval of the Security Council. 23 NATO
did not have Security Council approval and its use of force was not
authorized under these provisions.
2.
The U.N. Charter Authorizes Individual, Collective, and
Anticipatory Self-Defense
Even without Security Council approval, however, it seems that regional
organizations may legitimately use force in self-defense under article 51.
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter allows nations to use armed
force for self-defense, or defense of others, when attacked. That article
states that "nothing in the . . . Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations .... ,,24 Article 5 of the NATO Treaty
similarly allows NATO to use force in self defense against an "armed
attack.,,25 If Yugoslavia had attacked another nation, these articles would
have authorized the victimized nation and its allies to respond with
armed force.

19. Sharp, supra note 1, at 318-19; Grant, supra note 5, at 19.
20. Sharp, supra note 1, at 323-24.
21. Klinton W. Alexander, NATO'S Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating
Yugoslavia's National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval, 22 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 403, 436 (2000), citing Judith Miller, The Secretary General Offers Implicit Endorsement of
Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A1.
22. Grant, supra note 5, at 19.
23. U.N. CHARTER art. 53.
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
25. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5, 34 U.N.T.S. at 246.
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The problem with using these articles as justification for the NATO
bombing is that Yugoslavia made no attack against a member of the
United Nations, or indeed even against any other nation. Yugoslavia's
actions were entirely within its own borders, against its own citizens. As
horrendous as Yugoslavia's acts against its own citizens were, they were
not grounds for an armed response under any provisions of the United
Nations Charter. To the contrary, article 2(7) of the Charter provides that
"Nothing ... in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which essentially are within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state .... ,,26
Yugoslavia's argument, therefore, is that no other nation may act,
especially with force, when Yugoslavia applies its own domestic policies
to its own peoples. This argument is well-grounded in the language of
the Charter.
The opposing argument asserts that Yugoslavia is a "threatening
presence" in the area, and that this threat gives rise to a claim of
collective self-defense?? Under this position, Yugoslavia's actions
threaten other nations, not only because refugees from Yugoslavia pour
into neighboring nations to escape the massacres in Yugoslavia, but also
because the strong anti-minority sentiment in Yugoslavia may have
dangerous effects on those minorities who live in neighboring nations?8
Further, Yugoslavia's prior actions, such as its attack against Croatia and
Slovenia and its support for the Serbians in the Bosnian civil war, were
aimed at expanding its borders over neighboring states with Serbian
populations?9 Thus states bordering Yugoslavia had reason to see
Yugoslavia as a threatening presence in the area. 3D
The NATO members, however, were not among the nations arguably
threatened. None of them bordered Kosovo, and only one member
(Hungary) bordered Yugoslavia. 31
Further, the existence of a "threatening presence" does not justify the use
of force under the plain language of Article 51. Force may be used only
in response to an "armed attack."

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

U.N. Charter art. 2(7).
Schwabach, supra note 18, at 409.
[d. at 409, 411.
[d. at 409.
[d.
Schwabach, supra note 18, at 409.
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But some commentators have argued that self-defense includes
"anticipatory collective self-defense." In other words, a group of nations
should not have to sit back and wait until an attack on one of them
actually occurs if an attack is imminent.
Commentators . advocating an anticipatory collective self-defense
argument have used a six-prong test to determine whether self-defense is
justified. The prongs are: (1) the use of force is proportional, (2) the use
of force is necessary, (3) the threat is instant, (4) the threat is
overwhelming, (5) there is no peaceful alternative, and (6) there is no
time for deliberation. 32
This test fails here. Let us assume arguendo that the first four prongs
were met: the use of force was proportional to the perceived risk, the use
of force was necessary to prevent serious harm, the threat was immediate
and ongoing. But the last tow elements were not satisfied. First, other
alternatives existed to bombing Kosovo, such as economic sanctions or
the sending of peace-keeping forces. Further, NATO contemplated
taking action for months before deciding to bomb,33 thus giving the lie to
the argument that no time for deliberation existed. Thus, the NATO
bombing was not justified by a theory of "anticipatory self-defense," at
least under the United Nations Charter.
.
Nor can NATO argue that its attack was justified as an enforcement
technique, as opposed to an act of self-defense. A regional organization
cannot use force as an enforcement technique unless it first obtains
authorization from the Security Council. 34
The NATO bombing of Kosovo was not authorized under the specific
provisions of the United Nations Charter. Therefore we must examine
whether it can be justified under customary international law.
B.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AUTHORITY FOR
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The use of force may sometimes be authorized, under customary
international law, to protect people from genocide and other human
rights abuses. Such a power, however, must be carefully delineated and
limited.

32.
33.
34.

[d.
[d.
U.N. CHARTER art. 53(1).
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The Use of Force to Prevent Genocide.

The U.N. Charter does not state that its provisions are the only possible
authority for using force. In fact the U.N. Charter states that regional
organizations may deal with "matters relating to the maintenance of
[regional] international peace and security" so long as the organization's
actions are "consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations.,,35 Thus, the use of force, although not authorized by a specific
provision of the U.N. Charter, may be lawful if it is not inconsistent with
United Nations purposes and is otherwise lawful--in other words, if it
conforms to customary international law.
When a practice is generally accepted, it begins to form a part of
customary internationallaw. 36 A custom has been developing in recent
years whereby nations may use force to intervene to prevent human
rights abuses and genocide within the boundaries of other separate
sovereign nations?7 Thus, even though the use of force is not explicitly
authorized by the U.N. Charter, it may be authorized by customary
international law .
Using force to protect people from genocide suffered at the hands of their
own government is not inconsistent with the U.N. Charter or the
purposes of the United Nations. In fact, humanitarian intervention is
consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Many believe that the formation of the United Nations, on the heels of
the Nazi atrocities of World War II, was the starting place for the modem
position favoring humanitarian intervention?8
This argument finds support in the very Preamble to the U.N. Charter,
which states that one of the Charter's purposes is to "reaffIrm faith in
fundamental human rights .... ,,39
Article 1(3) goes on to emphasize that the Charter seeks to achieve
international cooperation in "promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all .... ,,40

35.
U.N. CHARTER art. 52(1).
36.
Geissler, supra note 6. at 329, citing IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE
OF FORCE BY STATES 6-7 (1963).
37.
Sharp, supra note I, at 313.
38. Id. at 315-316 n.156 and accompanying text.
39.
U.N. CHARTER Preamble.
40. Id. at art. 1(3).
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Article 55 states that
the United Nations shall promote: ... universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all .... 41
Article 56 requires that
[a]ll members pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for
the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55. 42
These provlSlons indicate that humanitarian purposes are one of the
primary goals of the Charter. Because humanitarian concerns are at the
very heart of the Charter, the Charter provides a basis for humanitarian
intervention.
Scholar Jordan Paust argued that the intervention in Kosovo promoted
the purposes of the United Nations. 43 He stated that the intervention
served the general purposes of the United Nations listed in Article 1 of
the Charter which include the preservation of peace, security, selfdetermination of peoples, and respect for and observance of human
rights. 44
He added that the action was legal under Articles 55 and 56 be-cause all
member states are required to take joint and separate action for the
universal respect for and observance of human rights. .. [including to]
prevent and punish ... [genocide].45
Further support for humanitarian intervention is found in the Genocide
Convention of 1948,46 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948,47 and the Geneva Conventions of 194948 .

41.

Id. at art. 55.
Id. at art. 56.
43. Geissler, supra note 6, at 342.
44. Geissler, supra note 6, at 342, citing Jordan J. Paust, NATO's Use of Force in Yugoslavia,
33 UNITED NATIONS LAW REPORTS 114, 114 (John Carey ed., May 1, 1999).
45. Id at 342, citing Paust, supra note 44, at 115.
46. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,78
U.N.T.S. 277, 280 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].

42.
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The Genocide Convention in particular calls upon the United Nations to
take such action as appropriate for "the prevention and suppression of
acts of genocide.'.49 Acts of genocide include killing, or inflicting
serious harm, on members of an ethnic group with an intent to destroy
that groUp.50 The crime of genocide transcends the inviolability of
states,51 and using force to prevent it is legal. The crime of genocide was
occurring in Kosovo. Because NATO intervened to prevent it, NATO's
action was legal.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights condemns the unlawful
taking of life,52 and the Geneva Conventions prohibits the murder of
civilians. 53 These agreements encourage signatories to take action when
a state violates the agreements' provisions. 54 Yugoslavia was unlawfully
taking lives and killing civilians. Therefore, NATO's intervention was
legal.
Additionally, there are several precedents for modern, post-Charter
humanitarian intervention. In the 1970's, India intervened in Bangladesh
to prevent appalling atrocities.55 Tanzania intervened in Uganda in 1979
to end the barbaric rule of Idi Amin.56 In 1990, several west African
countries intervened in Liberia to stop mass killings,57 and again in Sierra
Leone in 1998.58 In 1991 the Allies intervened in Iraq to protect the

47.
READER

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, reprinted in THE HUMAN RIGHTS
197-202 (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubins eds., 1989)[hereinafter Human Rights Conven-

tion].
4S. See generally Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (Geneva
Convention I); Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 V.N.T.S. S5
(Geneva Convention m; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Geneva Convention ill); Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
(Geneva Convention N) [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Conventions].
49. Genocide Convention, supra note 46, at 282.
50. Id.
51. Schwabach, supra note IS, at 417, citing Philip Stephens, Fighting a Just War, FiNANCIAL
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1999, at 12.
52. Human Rights Convention, supra note 47, at 197-202.
53. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 48, at 29S.
54. Geissler, supra note 6, at 33S.
55. Sharp, supra note I, at 315 n.152 and accompanying text, citing Law and Right, supra note
IS, at 20.
56. Id.; Schwabach, supra note 18, at416.
57. Sharp, supra note I, at 315 n.152 and accompanying text, citing Law and Right, supra note
IS, at 20. These nations included Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast, Cameroon,
Chad, and Niger.
5S. Grant, supra note 5, at 45-46.
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Kurds. 59 Although none of these actions were officially approved by the
Security Council, the actions received widespread acceptance. The
interventions in Uganda and Iraq, particularly, were widely accepted and
approved. 60
Protecting human rights also was cited as part of the justification for the
United States' sending troops to the Dominican Republic in 1961, and
again to Grenada in 1984.61 In the latter two instances, no allegations of
genocide were made. Rather, the circumstances were anarchy, riots, and
political upheaval. Arguable these situations are additional grounds for
humanitarian intervention, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
The humanitarian interventions in Bangladesh, Uganda, Sierra Leone,
Liberia, and Iraq support the argument that using force to protect people
from killings and other human rights abuses has become customary
international law.
The idea of humanitarian intervention is not new. The first reference to
humanitarian intervention was in 1579,62 and by the end of the nineteenth
century most scholars believed that humanitarian intervention was
legal. 63
In more modern times, however, the right of humanitarian intervention
has been the subject of conflicting views. In fact, between 1900 and
World War II, scholars assumed that the rights of sovereign nations to do
whatever they wanted to their own citizens within their own borders was
paramount. 64 Execution and torture within a state were significant only

59. Id.; Schwabach, supra note 18, at 416. Although the action to protect the Kurds was not
specifically authorized by the Security Council, some argue that it was approved as a part of the war
authorized by the Security Council to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. See Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Ceasefires,
and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 124-125 (1999). However, the war had
officially ended before the Allies acted to protect the Kurds. In any event, many U.N. members
acquiesced in the effort to provide safe havens for the Kurds. Schwabach, supra note 18, at 416
n.55.
60. Sharp, supra note I, at 315 n.152 and accompanying text; Schwabach, supra note 18, at
416.
61. Geissler, supra note 6, at 329-31.
62. Malvina Halberstam, The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMPo L. I, 2 (1995).
63. Geissler, supra note 6, at 333, citing BROWNLIE, supra note 36, at 338.
64. Sharp, supra note I, at 315, citing NATIONAL SECURITY LAw 674-75 (John Norton Moore
et aI., eds., 1990).
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if they were imposed upon a foreign nationa1.65 Otherwise, a state's
internal acts could not be addressed by internationallaw. 66
But this rule has been changing. 67 After World War II, both in the
United Nations Charter and in subsequent conventions, nations agreed in
binding treaties not to torture or kill their citizens. 68 These promises,
coupled with contemporary state practice, have combined to create a
customary international law permitting the use of armed force to prevent
genocide and other human rights abuses which violate international
law. 69
Opponents of humanitarian intervention argue the traditional view, that
the sovereignty of nations is paramount, superseding any human rights
concerns. 70 To support the continuing validity of this view, they point to
articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the Charter.
Article 2(4) provides that
All members shall refrain in their international relations
form the threat of use of force against the territorial
integrity . . . of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.71
Article 2(7), as discussed in section ILA.2, supra, states that the U.N.
may not intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of any state.
Relying on these provisions to oppose humanitarian intervention is
misplaced. Humanitarian intervention does not violate article 2(4)
because humanitarian actions are not directed at the territorial integrity or
political independence of governments. 72 Humanitarian intervention is
not directed at changing territorial boundaries or the government of the

65. Sharp, supra note I, at 315-316 n.156 and accompanying text, citing NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW, supra note 64, at 674-75.
66. Grant, supra note 5, at 45.
67. Id.
68.
Sharp, supra note I, at 315, citing NATIONAL SECURITY LAw, supra note 64, at 674-75.
69. Sharp, supra note I, at 315; Geissler, supra note 6, at 344.
70. Geissler, supra note 6, at 335. Among the scholars opposing any right of humanitarian
intervention is Ian Brownlie, who states that it is illegal and finds no consensus in the documents of
the United Nations or the drafts of the International Law Commission. Id. Brownlie further states
that any right of human intervention which existed pre-Charter would not have survived the prohibitions of the Charter. Sharp, supra note 1, at 315, citing BROWNLIE, supra note 36, at 342.
71. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
72. Geissler, supra note 6, at 327.
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target country.73 The use of force in Kosovo, for example, was not
intended to topple the government. Instead, the purpose of humanitarian
intervention is to protect people from human rights abuses. 74
Additionally, humanitarian interventions do not violate article 2(7). As
human rights have gained acceptance, the notion of state sovereignty has
lost ground. 75 Human rights issues are no longer considered purely
domestic issues.76 Genocide is no longer considered a local matter, but a
breach of the international peace. 77
A minority of international scholars argue that humanitarian intervention
is not legal. In addition to relying on the United Nations Charter
provisions discussed above, they point to the opposition of China, India,
and Russia to the NATO bombings. They argue that the "wide
acceptance" necessary for a practice to become customary international
law cannot occur when three of the world's four most populous counties
reject the practice. 78
However, all nineteen member countries of NATO supported the
bombing, and many other nations supported it as well. 79 When China,
India, and Russia introduced a resolution to condemn NATO, the other
twelve members voted it down.8o This indicates the implicit acceptance
of the great majority of Security Council members that the NATO
bombing was lawful. 81
Enforcement actions in the United Nations historically have been
hindered by the permanent member veto power. 82 The perpetual
disagreements of these members should not prevent an emerging norm
from being considered as customary international law . In fact, the better
argument is that widespread acceptance of the NATO action83 indicates
acceptance of the use of force in humanitarian interventions, especially

73.
74.
75.
Kosovo,

Id. at 337.
Id.
Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from
41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1772 (2000).
76.
Id.
77. Geissler, supra note 6, at 327,337.
78. Schwabach, supra note 18, at 417.
79. Geissler, supra note 6, at 338.
80. Sharp, supra note I, at 321-22.
81. Id. at 322.
82. Mertus, supra note 75, at 1777.
83. The NATO action was specifically approved by nineteen NATO members, all of which
were also members of the United Nations. In addition, several other nations voiced their approval of
the NATO action. Geissler, supra note 36, at 338.
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considering that three permanent members of the Security Council (the
U.S., France, and the U.K.) were NATO members which voted in favor
of the bombing.
U sing force to prevent genocide and other human rights abuses,
therefore, is not only consistent with the purposes of the United Nations,
it is increasingly accepted under customary international law. 84 Under
this view, the bombing of Kosovo was legal.
2.

Limitations on Humanitarian Intervention

There are some risks in allowing humanitarian intervention. Only a few
powerful states are in a position to use their economic and military power
on behalf of human rights. 85 Thus, the doctrine could be perverted or
manipulated for the gain of the powerful nation. 86 During the cold war
period, for example, some states misused the doctrine as a pretext for
occupying other states. 8?
An international consensus should be established as to humanitarian
interventions. This could be accomplished by United Nations resolutions
or through Conventions. 88 This consensus could clarify the standards
required for humanitarian intervention.
Some of the criteria could include:
(1) That the threat of immediate genocide or extreme human
. hts abuses eXIsts.
. 89
ng
(2) That peaceful diplomatic efforts have failed or are unlikely
to be effective.
(3) That the intervening states have little or no interest in the
affairs of the target state beyond the human rights concerns.
(This would assure that the motives of the intervening state be
overridingly humanitarian, rather than self-interested. 90)

84.
85.
87.
88.

Sharp, supra note 1, at 325.
Mertus, supra note 75, at 1778.
Jd.; Geissler, supra note 6, at 333.
Mertus, supra note 75, at 1778.
Geissler, supra note 6, at 345.

89.

Jd.

90.

Mertus, supra note 75, at 1779-80.

86.
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(4) That the use of force is necessary, and the force used will be
appropriate and will end when the goal has been accomplished.

These criteria would assure that humanitarian interventions are just that,
and not power grabs which would violate articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the
Charter.
Some commentators have suggested that humanitarian intervention occur
only when it is requested by the target state. 91 This suggestion is wholly
impractical. First, a government which is violating the rights of its
citizens is unlikely to request humanitarian assistance to protect its
citizens from itself. Second, such an act would not be humanitarian
intervention, but humanitarian assistance, an entirely different matter. 92
Perhaps the criteria should be, instead, that the victims would welcome
the intervention.93
If criteria such as these were established, states would have a standard by
which to judge whether they should use force, and the international
community would readily know whether the states who were
"intervening" were conforming to international law .

III.

CONCLUSION

International law scholar and professor Julie Mertus has pointed out that
"[m]eaningful humanitarian intervention does not threaten the world
order. Rather, it vindicates the very principles on which the United
Nations was founded.,,94
As an exercise of humanitarian intervention, NATO's decision to bomb
Kosovo was justified, moral, and most of all, legal under customary
international law. 95 In the future, the United Nations should consider
establishing specific criteria for such interventions, to prevent potential
abuses.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
who was
paper.

Geissler, supra note 6, at 333.
Mertus, supra note 75, at 1779-80.
[d. at 1779.
Mertus, supra note 75, at 1787.
The bombing itself may have gone beyond the bounds of what was justified in terms of
targeted and what types of bombs were used; these details are not within the scope of this
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